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THEMES AND VARIATIONS: THE CONVERGENCE OF




The generally accepted definition of the phrase "corporate governance"
comes from the seminal report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Cor-
porate Governance, which was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury.' The Cadbury Re-
port defines corporate governance as "the system by which companies are directed
and controlled.",2 It has been defined by others as "a system of checks and bal-
ances between the board, management and investors to produce an efficiently func
tioning corporation, ideally geared to produce long-term value."3 At its most basic,
corporate governance deals with the relationships among various stakeholders with
respect to the control of corporations. Above all, corporate governance addresses
the relationship between the owners of a company - the shareholders who are the
principals-and those who manage the company's operations - the executives
hired to run the company as agents of the principals. 4 Corporate governance en-
compasses the weight given to various factors in connection with the process for
making strategic decisions, the adequacy and transparency of disclosures, the reli-
ability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations.5
Over the past several years, scholars have written extensively about the con-
Vice President, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. L.L.M., Georgetown University (1992); J.D., University of
Tulsa (1987). Ms. Garrett also serves on the national board of directors of the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, the nation's top corporate governance organization. The views presented in this
article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., its
officers, directors, subsidiaries or affiliates.
1. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Dec. I, 1992),
available at www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector /cg/docs/cadbury.pdf (last visited Feb. I, 2004)
[hereinafter Cadbury Report].
2. Id. at § 2.5.
3. Governance and Executive Compensation: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
107th Cong. 2 (2002) (testimony of Dr. Carolyn Kay Brancato, Director, Global Corporate Governance
Research Center, The Conference Board, before the Senate Finance Committee on April 18, 2002, at 2),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/041802cbtest.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
4. Cadbury Report, supra note 2, at § 2.5.
5. See id.
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vergence of corporate governance practices around the world.6 In the post-Enron
era and with the passing of the first anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 7 we
can clearly see that the pace of change has hastened; in some markets where corpo-
rate governance was nascent, it has advanced considerably in a short period of time
as regulators around the world are united by a desire to restore the confidence of
investors in the world's securities markets. Despite the swift change, the conver-
gence of governance practices will never be complete for many reasons, although
certain core principles will be recognized in virtually every country as fundamental
to a market economy
This article reviews some of the factors affecting this convergence process
and also looks at the status of convergence between the United States' governance
laws and practices and those of certain other major markets. Specifically, the arti-
cle briefly reviews recent corporate governance changes in Canada, Germany Ja-
pan, Mexico and the United Kingdom from the perspective of a practitioner who
has been involved in various governance issues in subsidiaries and acquisitions in
these markets. In each of these countries, one constant is that the corporate gov-
ernance principles to which companies are subject are imposed through several
sources. In the United States, for example, principles of corporate governance ap-
plicable to a public company created under the laws of Delaware are derived from
the Delaware General Corporation Law,8 state and federal securities laws, and the
listing standards of any stock exchanges upon which that company's stock is
listed. 9
FACTORS AFFECTING CONVERGENCE
Internal and external factors influence companies to establish good govern-
ance practices. While certain factors that influence companies in the area of corpo-
rate governance are specific to the country, or even the state or province in which a
company is domiciled, many of these factors transcend geographic borders. Many
different factors, such as the philosophical approach, market forces, political forces
6. See generally Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321 (2001); William W Bratton & Joseph A. McCa-
hery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross
Reference, 38 COLUM. J TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
641 (1999); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Cor-
porate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism? 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833 (1998); Edward B. Rock.
America Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 367
(1996).
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.
(2002).
8. 8 Del. Code §§101 et seq. (2003).
9. See generally Hillary A. Sale, Delaware Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004);
Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, And Federal
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003); and William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 953 (2003).
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and the cooperation of various global entities, have played a role in the progress
toward convergence.'0
THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE
One impediment to complete convergence is the varying philosophical ap-
proach to governance regulations. Some countries approach corporate governance
in a manner that differs substantially from the approach adopted in the United
States. With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the adoption by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission of various enhanced corporate governance stan-
dards, the United States has progressed even further into a law-based, or rules-
based, approach to governance." The legislation, regulations, and stock exchange
listing requirements relating to governance are extremely detailed. Failure to com-
ply with these highly specific rules may result in penalties.
Conversely, in some of the world's other markets, the approach is a princi-
ples-based approach. 12 In those countries favoring a principles-based approach to
the regulation of corporate governance, the government may adopt - or even allow
self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges to adopt - general prin-
ciples of corporate governance. 3 A simple explanation of the difference between
the two approaches is illustrated by the different concepts conveyed by the terms
"law" and "guideline."'i 4 The result is a different mindset with respect to corporate
governance in the United States, which applies a rule- or law-based approach,
where what is not prohibited is permitted, compared to a principles-based approach
where greater discretion is vested in a company's management to make decisions
regarding governance activities.
A principles-based approach to governance is one in which guidelines are
clear, but compliance with them is voluntary Some countries have adopted a
"comply or disclose" approach to corporate governance, which requires corpora-
tions to disclose whether they comply with governance guidelines. I5 Other coun-
tries have adopted a "comply or explain" approach, which requires corporations
not only to disclose whether they comply with governance guidelines, but also re-
quire the explanation of any reasons for non-compliance. 16 Typically, the compli-
ance or non-compliance disclosure is made in a filing with either the stock ex-
10. See generally Alex Y Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L
L. J. 429 (1997).
I1. See e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Princi-
ples Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV 1023 (2003).
12. See id. at 1037
13. See generally Bratton, supra note 11.
14. See PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Wait Disney Pictures
2003), where the pirate captain, Barbossa, tells Elizabeth, "First, your return to shore was not part of
our negotiations nor our agreement, so I must do nothin' And secondly, you must be a pirate for the
Pirate's Code to apply, and you're not. And thirdly, the Code is more what you'd call 'guidelines' than
actual rules.
15. See generally Bratton, supra note II.
16. See generally id.
2004
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change or a government agency 17
THE EFFECT OF MARKET FACTORS ON GOVERNANCE
Good corporate governance is of utmost importance in today's economic en-
vironment because it affects investors, capital markets and the companies them-
selves. In a recent study sixty-three percent of investors said that they would
avoid investing in certain companies if those companies had poor corporate gov-
ernance practices.18 Fifty-seven percent of investors said they would change their
holdings in companies based on the corporate governance practices of those com-
panies. 19 In the alternative, investors in many countries are willing to pay substan-
tial premiums to invest in well-governed companies. In Africa and Eastern
Europe, the premiums can be as high as thirty percent, while in Western Europe
20and North America, the premiums are in the low teens.
These same investors indicated that corporate governance can have a pro-
found effect on the capital market of particular countries. 21 Thirty-one percent of
investors said they would avoid holdings in certain countries based on the general
governance practices in those countries. 22 Companies from around the word com-
pete against each other for capital in the global markets.23 The need to go outside
the country for capital may be due to the lack of depth of the capital markets in a
company's home country, or the possibility of obtaining lower rates abroad.24
Companies from those countries viewed as having lax laws governing transparency
and disclosure will have a competitive disadvantage as the rates they pay for capi-
tal in the global markets will be higher.25
Rating agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch now evaluate,
in addition to the financial ratios they have always reviewed, governance issues in
17. See generally id.
18. McKINSEY & COMPANY, GLOBAL INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY: KEY FINDiNGS, (2002), avail-
able at http://www.mckinsey.com/practices/corporategovemance/PDF/GloballnvestorOpinionSur-





23. See generally Christopher J. Mailander, Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the
International Marketplace: Lessons on Meeting Globalization Challenge Drawn from the Interna-
tional Bond Market, 31 G. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 341 (1998).
24. See James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies
Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STANFORD J. OF L. Bus. & FIN. 51 (1997).
25. In meeting of the World Economic Forum in Mexico in 2001, Frederic Sicre, Managing Di-
rector of the Centre for Regional Strategies at the World Economic Forum noted that "Management
should not consider corporate governance as a straightjacket, but rather as a means to lower its cost of
capital. World Economic Forum, Mexico Meeting 2001 Report: Managing New Expectations and
Old Challenges at 34, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Mexico/Mexico-report_2001 .pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004).
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assigning a debt rating to companies. 26 In a competitive marketplace, the rate at
which a company can finance debt is directly related to the company's credit rat-
ing. 27 Where a company's risk of default is determined to be high by the ratings
agencies, the company must pay a higher rate to raise capital, possibly issuing junk
bonds which require high interest rates to compensate investors for the high risk of
default, than a company which can issue investment grade bonds.
For the companies themselves, governance can have a great impact. Poor
governance, as seen in the media over the past two years, can lead to the implosion
of respected and successful companies. 28  Poor governance can also affect stock
prices, as investors sell stock in companies that have a reputation for poor govern-
ance practices. 29 Not only can poor governance affect companies' stock prices, it
may also affect courtroom outcomes. A recent study found that seventy-three per-
cent of jurors believe auditors will lie for their clients, while seventy-eight percent
believe companies destroy documents. Particularly in the United States, this mis-
trust of corporations may lead to larger jury verdicts in the future for corporations
that have a reputation for poor governance and, perhaps, for all corporations.
26. S&P Moody's, and Fitch have been designated by the SEC as Nationally Recognized Statisti-
cal Rating Organizations. See Written Statement of Rating and Investment Information, Inc.. Submitted
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission In Connection with the November 15 and 21, 2002
Hearings on Credit Rating Agencies at 2 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at
www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/ratingsinvest.htm (last visited Feb. i, 2004). Like corporate Amer-
ica, these groups face increased regulations as a result of recent corporate scandals; they did not down-
grade WorldCom or Enron until bankruptcy was inevitable. This was the impetus for these organiza-
tions to begin scrutinizing governance at the companies they review. See e.g., Claire A. Hill, Ratings
Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 1145 (2003).
27. For a discussion of the credit rating agencies and their impact on a corporation's cost of capi-
tal, see generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel & Eberts of Financial Markets? Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. UNiV. L. Q. 619 (1999).
28. See 2002 Report on the Corporate Performance Project, Conformance & Performance-
Corporate Governance: As Conformance Duty-An Assessment of Progress as Performance Opportu-
nity-Is There Real Potential, World Economic Forum in Partnership with Deloitte Touche Tomatsu,
available at www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/WEFreport 2002(2).pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
29. The Brunswick Group, Opinion Research Corporation Study of U.S. Attitudes Toward Com-
panies Facing Litigation, Litigation: the Bottom Line, available at www.brunswickgroup.com
/indexflash.htm (last visited March 29, 2004). The study showed that in 2003 over sixty percent of
investors considered selling stock in companies accused of wrongdoing in lawsuit, compared to just
over 50% in 2001.
30. Minority Corporate Counsel Association, DecisionQuest/MCCA Juror Perception Survey
Warns of Intense Corporate Distrust by America' Juries (October 16, 2002), available at
http://mcca.com/site/data/researchprograms/surveys/dq_mcca-survey 2002.htm (last visited March 29,
2004).
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THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP DISPERSION ON
GOVERNANCE
The type of corporate structure common in some countries can lead to differ-
ent results in the corporate governance arena. In Germany, for example, there is a
two-tiered board structure consisting of a management board called the Vorstand
and a supervisory board of outside directors called the Aufstchtsrat.3i Members of
the Vorstand cannot, at the same time, be members of the A ufstchtsrat.32 The exis-
tence, at the highest level in the corporation, of a board of independent, outside di-
rectors, arguably abrogates the need m Germany for some of the corporate govern-
ance principles gaining traction in the United States, such as requiring independent
audit or compensation committees.
Ownership dispersion also differs from country to country, creating different
governance concerns in some other countries than those that exist in the United
States. In the United States and United Kingdom, ownership dispersion is high,
while in France, Canada and Germany ownership dispersion is low. 33 The com-
monplace family or bank ownership structures in Canada, Germany, Japan and
Mexico may make investors in those cultures more comfortable with control of the
corporation resting in a limited number of individuals having a high percentage of
ownership. Differences in the number of individual investors in comparison to in-
stitutional investors may also lead to apposite results in various countries. Institu-
tional investors can be expected actively to monitor firm performance because of
the expertise they possess.34 Further, their large ownership stakes motivate them to
engage in active monitoring.
In Japan and the United Kingdom, for example, companies may have com-
mercial dealings with many banks, but rely heavily on one main bank as their pri-
mary source of funds.35 These banks may exercise very little control during period
of smooth sailing. Until the company faces a crisis, the banks are likely to eschew
intervention. When a crisis occurs, the banks become more active, exercising their
rights as lenders and at times, substantial shareholders, to guide the company
through the crisis or oversee reorganization by replacing management, restructur-
ing debt and trimming expenses.
During the past two decades, institutional investors such as mutual funds and
31. DR. THOMAS KUSTOR, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY IN AUSTRIA at lb, 2 (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, July 2002), available at http://www.aiu.com/aiu/PDF/Austria.pdf [last visited
March 29, 2004] (discussing the Limited Liability Company Act (GmbH-Gesetz), and The Stock Cor-
poration Act (Aktiengesetz)).
32. Id. at 2.
33. Eric R. Gedajlovic & Daniel M. Shapiro, Management and Ownershp Effects: Evidences
from Five Countries, 19 STRATEGIC MGM'T J. 533, 536 (1998).
34. See e.g., David Bank, CALPERS Won't Back 5 Directors of H-P in Protest ofAuditing, WALL
STREET JOURNAL, March 11, 2004 and Tim Burt & Christopher Parks, The Walt Disney Crisis: A 'Re-
sounding Victory for Shareholders, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 5, 2004.
35. For discussion of the Japanese Banking System, see generally THE JAPANESE MAIN
BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES
(Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).
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pension funds have played an increasingly important role in corporate governance
on both a domestic and international level. To some degree, this is the natural ef-
fect of the premium investors will pay for well-governed companies in markets
recognized as leaders in the areas of transparency and adequate disclosure. In-
creasingly, however, these institutional investors act as internal insurgents proac
tively attempting to influence corporations by issuing corporate governance state-
ments36 and filing shareholder proposals.
The institutional investors will also vote against certain management propos-
als viewed by the investors as lacking the hallmarks of good corporate governance.
For example, most institutional investors will vote against any proposed stock op-
tion plan that does not explicitly prohibit the repricing of options. 7 Institutional
investments originating in the United States dominate those from other countries.
Thus, the type of activism that institutional holders here exert will likely become
more prevalent abroad over time. Another effect is that there is pressure exerted
by these investors to bnng disclosure in other markets up to the levels of disclosure
United States investors have learned to expect. The activism of institutional hold-
ers helps to shape the goals set by companies with respect to governance.38 It also
helps determine the speed at which various governance issues are addressed by
both companies and governments and how issues are pnontized.
This institutional investor activism, which has been prevalent for years in the
United States, is being actively exported in the post-Enron era. The California
Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS), for example, has identified sev-
eral "Global Corporate Governance Principles" that are, in its view, minimum
standards of corporate governance. 39 CalPERS takes the position that in all mar-
kets, companies should adhere to these standards to attract investment from institu-
tional holders. 40 In April of 2003, CaIPERS issued a press release in which it an-
nounced a $200 million investment in The Taiyo Fund.4i The fund, based in
Japan, will function within Japan as an activist investor much as CalPERS has in
the United States.42 The Taiyo Fund, to avoid dissipating its influence, will make
significant investments in a relatively small number of companies to effect change
in the area of corporate governance in Japan.43
36. See e.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), Global Corporate Gov-
ernance Principles at 3, available at http://www.calpers-govemance.org/principles/international
/global/pageOl .asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) [hereinafter CaIPERS Global Corporate Governance
Principles].
37. See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Vot-
ing on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (2000).
38. See generally Klaus Eppler & Paul A. Kemnitzer, Corporate Governance Activities of Institu-
tional Investors and Other Activists, 1353 PLI/Corp I1 (2003).
39. CaIPERS Global Corporate Governance Principles, supra note 36, at 5.
40. Id
41. Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Invests $200 Million in Japan Corporate Governance
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THE EFFECT OF COMPENSATION PRACTICES ON GOVERNANCE
Compensation practices in various countries also play a role in the develop-
ment of governance practices. Boards of directors use base salaries, bonuses and
equity awards, such as stock options or restricted stock, to compensate a corpora-
tion's senior management. Certain types of compensation more closely align the
interests of the company's management with the interests of the company's own-
ers. For example, long-term incentive plans and stock options will in theory en-
courage company managers to act in harmony with the long-term good of the
company rather than making rash, short-term decisions. Institutional investors pay
close attention to compensation practices because compensation that is too gener-
ous can dilute their ownership over time. Many institutional holders make it a
practice to vote against certain types of compensation plans based on corporate
governance concerns. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services recom-
mends that institutional holders routinely vote against any stock option plan that
does not explicitly prohibit the repncing of options. Institutional holders also
pushed companies to expense stock options out of a sense that certain companies,
had they expensed options all along, would not have shown a profit.
44
Some institutional investors view executive pay issues as a touchstone for
whether the board properly oversees the management of the company After all,
the board of directors has been elected by the company's owners - the sharehold-
ers - to, among other things, hire the executives to run the company on their be-
half. Those executives report to the board of directors. If the executives' pay is
too high, it results from a board that may be too easily swayed by a powerful per-
sonality or by the cache or remuneration of board service.45
THE EFFECT OF THE MARKET FOR CONTROL ON CONVERGENCE
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions may also affect corporate governance
views and practices. As a company in the acquisition mode examines various tar-
get companies in a particular market, it will pay a premium for the well-governed
target company. The due diligence process that occurs in connection with an ac
44. See generally Stephen Taub, Coke to Treat Options as the Real Thing, CFO.com, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,7452,00.html?f=related (last visited March 29,2004).
45. D. Quinn Mills, Paradigm Lost: The Imperial CEO, 4 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 27 41 (Summer
2003). Professor Mills makes the observation that:
Initial efforts to retrain strong CEOs have not been promising. Boards have begun to cut
back the severance packages of retired or resigned CEOs, especially those under investi-
gation for fraud. Some boards are said to be getting less generous with pay packages.
But salary and perks are not the key to the imperial CEO power is. Excessive pay is
but a reflection of the dominant position that most CEOs have in their companies.
Unless the disproportionate power of the dominant CEO is addressed, it will soon pro-
vide him or her a way to again push compensation up dramatically and again afford the
independence from checks and balances that enables investors to be defrauded.
Id. at42.
Mills also observes that board rooms often have "club-like atmosphere" because many directors are
themselves CEOs or former CEOs. Id.
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quisition involves, among other things, examining the governance of the target
company, the independence of its directors, the quality of the company's financial
reporting and disclosure and the existence of related party transactions between the
company and its officers or directors. Similarly, a corporation "window dressing"
itself to be an attractive target may implement widely-recognized touchstones of
good governance to increase its price.
Even if a company is not a takeover target, as companies from other countries
enter into strategic alliances, joint ventures and other similar arrangements, these
partnerships will hasten the convergence of governance principles. A United
States company entering into a joint venture with an established company in a par-
ticular market will expect of that company a certain level of governance discipline.
Further, the agreements documenting the relationship between the two companies
may put into place governance mechanisms over the business that are designed to
provide the American company a level of comfort in the governance of the jointly-
run business.
Even within the country, underperforming firms will be purchased by rival
firms that are more competitive. In theory, these more competitive firms are so, in
part, because strategic decisions are made within a governance structure that al-
lows the best decisions to be made. Decisions that focus on the long-term health of
the company rather than ones that serve no purpose other than to entrench man-
agement in the company are made.
THE EFFECT OF LISTING STANDARDS ON CONVERGENCE
One factor playing an increasingly important role in the global convergence
of corporate governance principles is the listing of certain global companies with
the stock exchanges of multiple countries. Each major stock exchange requires
that the companies whose stock is traded on the exchange comply with certain list-
ing requirements, many of which directly address issues of corporate governance.
46
There are, for example, approximately 200 interlisted Canadian companies 47 which
must comply with not only the Toronto Stock Exchange listing requirements but
also the listing requirements of the United States exchange upon which they are
listed.48 Foreign companies have been encouraged to access capital through par-
ticipation in the United States capital markets. 49 American companies are also ac
46. See e.g., THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, available at www.tse.com/
en/productsAndServices/listings/tse/resources/resourceManual.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); THE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, available at
www.nyse.com/listed/p1020656067970.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004); LISTING STANDARDS OF THE
BOLSA MEXICANA DE VALORES, available at www.bmv.com.mx; ADMISSION AND DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, available at www.londonstockexchange.com
/about/pdfs/admiss standards_2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
47. Keeping Up, CORP SECRETARY 22 (Aug.-Sept. 2003).
48. The Ontario Securities Commission has been lobbying the Secunties and Exchange Commis-
sion to allow Canadian inter-listed companies to comply only with the Canadian regulations and not
United States rules. CORP SECRETARY 10 (Feb./March 2003).
49. Roel C. Campos, Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron Era, Remarks at the
2004
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tively courted by foreign stock exchanges.50 As companies seek to comply with
multiple listing standards in various countries, those companies may influence
global corporate governance in much the same way that global accounting stan-
dards have been influenced by multinationals.
Related to the issue of listing standards is the desire of stock exchanges of
other countries to give American investors access to the markets in those countries
through the use of trading screens in the United States. Several European Union
exchanges, in particular, have sought this access. 51 Under the Secuinties and Ex-
change Commission's rules, stock exchanges must register with the Commission to
offer and sell securities to the public.52 Further, the securities listed on those ex-
changes must be registered with the SEC. These exchanges oppose the idea of reg-
istration with the SEC and argue that governance by their home country is suffi-
cient. They are also limited because the exchanges could not, through the mere act
of registering, force all of the companies listed upon them to register with the SEC.
The SEC, above all, is in business to protect investors. The Commission remains
concerned that granting other exchanges access to investors on terms different than
the terms with which exchanges here must comply creates a competitive advantage
for the foreign exchanges. The depth of this country's capital markets is a testa-
ment to the SEC's long-standing successes in protecting investors; opening the
door to foreign exchanges here without appropriate controls could limit the SEC's
ability to exercise the same control in the future.
Centre for European Policy Studies (June 11, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/spch06]lO3rcc.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2004). The Commissioner stated:
.1 wish to reaffirm a simple message: European and other non-U.S. market players are
welcome and encouraged to participate in the U.S markets. The SEC has facilitated for-
eign participation in the past and will continue to do so, all within the framework of pro-
tecting investors through our existing secunties regulation. With this philosophy in
mind, over the past 70 years of the SEC's existence, we have afforded equal treatment to
all market participants. Few distinctions have been made based on the domicile of the is-
suer or service provider. After all, US investors are entitled to the same protections re-
gardless of whether an issuer is foreign or domestic. In addition, placing US market par-
ticipants at competitive disadvantage negatively affects the vibrancy of US markets
and, ultimately, would hurt US investors. Shielding US firms from foreign competition,
however, would deprive US investors of the benefits derived from the services and prod-
ucts offered by non-US competitors.
Id.
50. OTC CONSULTING & FINANCIAL SERVICES, DUAL LISTING IN GERMANY, at
http://www.duallisting.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). This is reference to the DAX mar-
keting materials inviting American companies to consider dual listing on the DAX as well as United
States exchanges. Interestingly, blue chip companies' stock is often listed on those exchanges anyway,
through programs similar to the unsponsored American Depository Receipt programs initiated by major
banks in the United States to "list" the stocks of prominent foreign firms.
51. See ICGN, JCGN History, at www.icgn.org/history.html (last visited March 29, 2004), and
ICGN, ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles (July 9, 1999), at
http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm (last visited March 29,2004).
52. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY, available at www.sec.gov/about/laws.stml (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON CONVERGENCE
Global organizations are significantly impacting the convergence of core gov-
ernance principles. Among these organizations are the International Corporate
Governance Network, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the United Nations, the Export Import Bank, the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions, the American Society of Corporate Secre-
taries in cooperation with its sister organizations in other countries, the
International Accounting Standards Board, the Institute of Internal Auditors, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation.
Seminars, conventions, publications, and meetings by and among these groups and
their members have led to certain principles of corporate governance being gener-
ally identified as core principles that must guide the behavior of corporations in a
market economy
There are several examples of international cooperation among various gov-
ernment agencies and membership organizations working toward corporate gov-
ernance convergence. As a case in point, in 1999 the OECD adopted Principles of
Corporate Governance.53 These principles do not suggest that any one structure
for companies' boards of directors is appropriate; different structures are appropri-
ate in different circumstances for many of the reasons discussed in this section on
factors affecting convergence. Similarly, in 1995, the International Corporate
Governance Network was formed by a group of institutional investors, such as
pension funds and financial institutions, to provide a forum for exchange on inter-
national corporate governance information.54 It published guidelines in 1999 that
have been relied on by many institutional investors in forming their own interna-
tional corporate governance principles. 55 The International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions has also released recent pronouncements on transparency and
disclosure, auditor independence and the board's role in the oversight of outside
auditors.56 The International Accounting Standards Board and the United States
Financial Accounting Standards Board are at work on global accounting standards;
the accounting rulemaking bodies of other countries are also focused on imple-
menting changes that would harmonize standards m their countries with accepted
norms of international accounting.
57
53. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Ad-Hoc Task Force on
Corporate Governance, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/50/4347646.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
54. See International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), JCGN History, at http:
//www.icgn.org/history.html and ICGN, ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles
(July 9, 1999), at http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm, (last visited March 29, 2004).
55. See International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), ICGN Statement on Global Corpo-
rate Governance Principles (July 9, 1999), at http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm (last
visited March 29, 2004).
56. See International Organization of Secunties Commissions, Objectives and Principles of Secu-
rities Regulation, (May 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf
(last visited March 29, 2004).
57. See Campos, supra note 49. In his speech Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron
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THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON CONVERGENCE
The stability of a country's government may also play a role in the develop-
ment of corporate governance practices in particular countres. Where the gov-
ernment is relatively stable, the government may be able to legislate regarding is-
sues in the corporate governance arena, whereas a less stable government's focus
may simply be entrenchment.
Beyond the borders of a single country, the creation of certain international
bodies such as the European Union (EU) is leading to convergence in the area of
corporate governance practices, as well as in the area of commercial law. The EU
has adopted a Financial Services Action Plan that addresses issues relating to cor-
porate law, accounting and auditing, as well as access to the capital markets. 5 A
focus on corporate governance principles is a very important part of the EU's goal
Era, the SEC Commissioner stated:
European officials and issuers for years have urged the SEC to accept financial state
ments prepared under 1AS without requiring reconciliation to US GAAP as required at
present. SEC staff has noted two important considerations in assessing this requirement:
progress in converging IAS and US GAAP and the development of an effective global
financial reporting infrastructure for the consistent application, auditing and enforcement
of IAS. Because investor protection is the fundamental mission of the SEC, we will look
at the quality of the information received by US investors. The standards themselves are
very important. No less critical is how standards are interpreted and applied in practice.
With respect to convergence of IAS and US GAAP it is widely agreed that similar,
high-quality answers to important accounting issues will benefit cross-border investors.
Convergence of accounting standards should translate into greater transparency. This ul-
timately will increase the comparability of financial statements for investors and lower
costs for cross-border issuers. As I mentioned earlier, the FASB and IASB entered into a
memorandum of understanding to work together toward the important goal of conver-
gence between US GAAP and lAS. The SEC has fully supported this project.
While the FASB and IASB convergence project is still in its early stages, and involves
many complicated issues, I continue to be encouraged by the progress being made. SEC
staff is working closely with these organizations to support an agenda that prioritizes
consistency among critical accounting standards.
In addition to our work with the IASB and the FASB to encourage short-term conver-
gence, we are working with regulators in other countries and with the accounting and
auditing profession on ways to encourage the development of an effective global infra-
structure for interpretation, auditing and enforcement of ]AS. Such an infrastructure is as
important as the accounting standards themselves. It is meant to ensure consistency and
accountability. Without such mechanism, a "single" set of standards quickly could de-
volve, for practical purposes, into multiple standards. In this context, we are encouraged
by the EU's work through CESR to develop a supporting infrastructure for IAS within
the EU. We continue to see 2005 as an interesting possible target date for evaluating
IAS.
Id.
58. See EUROPA, COMPANY LAW & CORPORATE GOVERNMENT, available at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/intemal market/company/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
VOL. 32:2
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
to create a single market for financial services in the EU.59
THE EFFECT OF THE MEDIA ON CONVERGENCE
Pressure from the fourth estate is another factor leading to changes in the cor-
porate governance arena. This pressure typically comes from a variety of media
sources. There is a tremendous amount of business media coverage in today's cli-
mate. Talk show hosts interview executives, regulators and business commenta-
tors and articles are written about various companies and industries nearly every
day. As a result of Enron, Worldcom and other high-profile frauds, much of the
coverage has centered on issues of governance and the independence of directors.
The media is now more attuned to issues of this ilk, and specific coverage of com-
panies is likely to include coverage regarding governance practices. The value of
the contribution of the media to the governance debate depends on the journalist's
background; journalists who cover particular industries or companies gain insights
and business acumen that a general journalist will not possess, making their cover-
age both more accurate and more insightful. Finally, there are a number of gov-
ernance organizations that use media effectively to orchestrate a "name and
shame" process. These organizations will publish "10 best" or "10 worst" lists in
an attempt to draw attention to the accomplishments or failings of companies in the
corporate governance arena.
60
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ON CONVERGENCE
To some degree, United States government regulations on the subject of cor-
porate governance have an extraterritorial effect, even where the effect was unin-
tended. For example, Regulation FD,6' which was passed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in August of 2000, is intended to level the playing field be-
59. The EU has stated that:
Harmonisation of the rules relating to company law and corporate governance, as well as
to accounting and auditing, is essential for creating a Single Market for Financial Ser-
vices and products. In the fields of company law and corporate governance, objectives
include: providing equivalent protection for shareholders and other parties concerned
with companies; ensuring freedom of establishment for companies throughout the EU;
fostering efficiency and competitiveness of business; promoting cross-border co-
operation between companies in different Member States; and stimulating discussions
between Member States on the modemisation of company law and corporate govern-
ance.
See id.
60. E.g., Press Release, The Corporate Library, Citigroup has the Highest Risk Board in the US
According to the Corporate Library's New Rating of Corporate Directors, (June 9, 2003) (on file with
author), at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.net/products/ratings_press-release.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
61. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716 (Aug. 24, 2000), at
http:/www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal/33-7881 .htm (last visited March 29,2004).
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tween analysts, institutional investors and individual investors. The Commission
believed that companies provided more information or earlier information to ana-
lysts and institutional investors than to individual investors.62 Regulation FD re-
quires that companies communicate material information contemporaneously to
these groups. 63 As companies from other countries court American investors, they
must be aware of the requirements of Regulation FD. Similarly, as American
companies deal with investors abroad, those companies will act as they have been
trained to act by their United States-based attorneys.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act64 also has an extraterritorial effect. Section 906 of
the Act,65 which is the officer certification provision to which criminal penalties
attach, applies to periodic reports containing financial statements. This would
cover not only Forms 10-K and 10-Q filed by United States issuers, but also Forms
20-F 40-F66 and 6-K filed by foreign issuers.67
Ethiopis Tafara, the Director of the SEC's Office of International Affairs, ac
knowledged in a speech that SEC actions have caused concerns in the international
community.6 The concerns include: (i) the required registration and inspection of
foreign audit firms, which are covered by the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board's 69 (PCAOB) broad-ranging authority to regulate auditing firms; (ii)
the potential violation of privacy laws, which are extremely strict in the European
Union and require that companies transmitting personal data take a number of pre-
cautions; and (iii) whether the PCAOB's inspection rights, which would give it
broad powers to require that foreign audit firms produce work papers relating to
their audits, are too broad. 70 The PCAOB will work in a cooperative manner with
accounting regulators from other countries to reach a consensus on these matters. 7'
62. See Michael P Daly & Robert A. Del Giomo, The SEC's New Regulation FD: A Critical
Analysts, ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 461-462 (2002).
63. Id. at 463.
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.
(2002).
65. 18 U.S.C. §1350(c) (2002).
66. This form is specific to Canadian issuers. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, at http:/Iwww.sec.gov/about/forms/
secforms.htm.
67 The SEC amended Forms 20-F and 40-F to include certifications by the officers. See SEC,
Final Rule: Certication of Disclosure in Companies Quarterly and Annual Reports, Release Nos. 33-
8124, 34-49427 IC-25722 (Aug. 29, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal33-8124.htm (last visited
March 29, 2004).
68. Ethiopis Tafara, U.S. Perspective on Accountancy Regulation and Reforms, Remarks at the
Annual Conference of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, (July 8, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch070803et.htm (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Tafara].
69. See generally Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, at http://www.pcaobus.org/ (last
visited February 28, 2004).
70. See Tafara, supra note 68.
71. "Although the PCAOB's final rules call for registration of non-US firms by April 2004, the
PCAOB hopes, before that time, to be able to make substantial progress with its foreign colleagues in
developing harmonized registration and oversight models. Id. See also Campos, supra note 49 (not-
ing that the SEC and the PCAOB have made a number of accommodations to foreign firms, including:
not requinng foreign audit firms to provide registration information to the PCAOB if it would violate
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Fortunately, the SEC has a long history of cooperation with regulators in
other countries. Over the years, many different mechanisms have developed to al-
low for the regulators of various nations to work together on matters affecting their
countries. These include memoranda of understanding between the SEC and its
counterparts, as well as arrangements for the sharing of information among regula-
tors and law enforcement agencies around the world.
GOVERNANCE CHANGES IN PARTICULAR MARKETS
All of the factors discussed above have had an effect on the convergence -
and speed of convergence - of core corporate governance principles. The section
which follows provides an overview of the status of governance in Canada, Ger-
many, Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom, the similarities to governance laws
in the United States, and any recent changes in governance in that market.
CANADA
According to an assistant secretary with a Canadian oil company, in Canada
"the bad news is that everything is changing. On the other hand, the good news is
that everything is changing. 72 The changes in corporate governance in the United
States have had a profound effect in Canada as well. Canada's primary securities
regulator is moving to a United States-style, rules-based corporate governance re-
gime.
One factor that significantly impacts securities regulation in Canada is the
lack of a single, national agency regulating securities. Instead, there are thirteen
provincial and territorial agencies responsible for the regulation of securities in
Canada.73 The Ontario Securities Commission, because the Toronto Stock Ex-
change is located within its jurisdiction, wields more power than the other regula-
tors in Canada.
Corporate governance issues are complicated in Canada by the lack of har-
monization among the various provinces, and by bickering amongst the various
provincial securities regulators. In British Columbia and Alberta, for example,
regulators favor a principles-based regulatory scheme, while in Ontario, regulators
favor a rules-based scheme patterned after new United States laws, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
It has been nine years since the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) first intro-
duced corporate governance disclosure regulations in response to the Dey report.74
the laws of their home country, granting foreign audit firms an additional six months during which to
register; and limiting the registration only to those who provide more than ten hours of work on the au-
dit).
72. Sylvia Groves, Assistant Corporate Secretary with Nexen, (quoted in Keeping Up, CORP
SECRETARY 22 (Aug.-Sept. 2003).
73. See Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA/ACVM), About the CSA (June 2001), at
http://www.csa-acvm.ca/htmiCSA/about who are csa.htm (last visited March 29, 2004).
74. The report is so named because Peter Dey chaired The Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on
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The TSX listing standards that were passed in 1994: (i) clearly identified the role
of directors as stewards of the corporation; (ii) required that the board have a ma-
jority of "unrelated directors; ' ' 75 (iii) noted that the board should review the ade-
quacy and form of compensation of directors; (iv) required that certain board
committees be compnsed of outside directors, a majority of whom are unrelated
directors; (v) required the audit committee to be comprised solely of outside direc
tors; and (vi) required that each company disclose on an annual basis its govern-
ance process with respect to the guidelines.
In 2002, the TSX proposed new governance standards.76 These new standards
require, for example, that boards oversee the company's strategic planning process;
that all members of the audit committee be financially literate,77 with at least one
member having "accounting or related financial expertise,, 78 and that the audit
committee have a charter 79 The new changes would also slightly tweak the defini-
tion of "independent directors, defining these individuals as directors "free from
any other relationship which could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere
with the director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the issuer."
80
The TSX also went on record as supporting stricter standards such as CEO and
CFO certification of the financial statement, but is deferng to legislators on this
issue.81 Following the TSX's guidance, Canadian securities regulators are propos-
ing certification rules similar to the requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Corporate Governance which released its report, "Where Were the Directors?" in December of 1994.
See Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance, at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/coun-
try documents/canada/dey.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
75. An "unrelated director" was defined by the TSE as one who is independent of management
and free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with
the director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation. See David Armstrong,
Corporate Governance in Canada (October 25, 2002), at http://www.ffhsj.com/SymposiumMaterial/
GC fall 02/corpgov canada.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Armstrong].
76. See id See also Toronto Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Policy-Proposed New Dis-
closure Requirement and Amended Guidelines (March 26, 2002), at http://www.ecgi.org/
codes/country documents/canada/policydraft_26mar2002.pdf [hereinafter TSX Corporate Governance
Policy] (last visited March 29, 2004).
77 Financially literate was defined by the TSE as the ability to read and understand financial
statements of complexity and scope similar to the issuer's financial statements. See Armstrong, supra
note 75, at 7.
78. Financial expertise is the ability to understand the issuer's financial statements and the gener-
ally accepted accounting principles used to prepare those statements; an ability to asses the application
of GAAP with respect to accruals, reserves and estimates; experience, either directly or through super-
vising others, in preparing or auditing financials in situation that would raise issues similar to the is-
sues the issuer faces; an understanding of internal controls; and knowledge of the audit committee's
role.
As in the United States, there is concern that the person designated as the financial expert on the
audit committee could be held to higher standard of care than other directors or face liabilities that
exceed those of other directors. The CSA did not include a specific safe harbor for the person desig-
nated as the "financial expert. Rather, the CSA has stated that the designation will not increase that
directors' personal liability. Id
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that chief executive officers and chief financial officers certify the accuracy of
their company's financial reporting.
82
The Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission asked that the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants address issues of auditor independence, rotation
of engagement partners, and possibly rotation of the firm. 3 The Chairman also
asked that the Law Society of Upper Canada consider whether to implement Sar-
banes-Oxley type rules governing professional conduct before the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission and whistle-blowing by outside counselYu On June 27 2003, the
Canadian Securities Administrators released proposed rules on governance issues
for public comment. 85 The rules cover audit committees,86 officer certifications
and auditor independence.8 7  The Proposed Rules follow the U.S. initiative of a
rules-based approach to corporate governance as opposed to the traditional Cana-
dian principles-based approach. Subsequently, the efforts of the Canadian Securi-
82. 18 U.S.C. 1350 (a), (b). (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act required the SEC to adopt rules requiring certification of the quarterly and annual periodic reports
filed with it. The SEC adopted Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 under the Exchange Act. The chief executive
officer and chief financial officer must now certify that they have reviewed the report, that to their
knowledge the report contains no false or misleading statements and does not omit any material facts,
the financial statements fairly present in all material respects the company's results of operations and
cash flows for the reporting period, that the signing officers are responsible for internal controls of the
issuer and have evaluated those controls within the prior ninety days, that they have disclosed to the
audit committee and outside auditors any significant deficiencies in controls and any fraud involving
management or employees having significant role in internal controls, and whether any factors could
significantly affect internal controls after the evaluation date. The format for this report is prescribed in
the SEC's release, and may not be altered.
A similar certification provision is contained in Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This pro-
vision, which has criminal implications, requires that the chief executive officer and chief financial of-
ficer certify that the periodic report fully complies with the requirements of the Exchange Act. Section
906(a) and (b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1350(a), (b). False certifications can result in pen-
alties of up to a $1 million fine, imprisonment for up to ten years, or both, for non-willful violations and
a $5 million fine, imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both, for willful violations. H.R. 3763, 107th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
83. Presently under Canadian corporate law, the shareholders select the auditors annually and set
the auditors' compensation. Canada Business Corporations Act, § 162. The approach suggested would
differ significantly from the existing approach. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 8.
84. See Armstrong, supra note 75, at 8.
85. See OSC, Notice of Request for Comments (June 27, 2003), at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en
/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rules/rule_52-108_20030627_c Inotice-roc.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
86. With respect to audit committees, the proposed rules are in many ways similar to the audit
committee requirements under the NYSE Listing Standards. For example, the audit committee must
have written charter. It must recommend the outside auditors and their fees to the full board, oversee
the work of the outside auditors, pre-approve non-audit services above a de nmmis threshold, review
filings and press releases, review hiring of external auditors or former external auditors as employees,
oversee the issuer's disclosure processes, and establish complaint procedures. See OSCB, Multilateral
Instrument 52-108, Auditor Oversight, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/links/pdfs
/OSCAuditorOversightJunO3.pdf, OSCB, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, Certification of Disclo-
sure in Companies Annual and Interim Filings, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/
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ties Administrators to lead governance reform in Canada have slowed as regulators
from the various jurisdictions have differing views about approaches to reform 88
If adopted "as is" the rules will become effective next year.
Ontario's government passed several new laws in late 2002 that strengthen
governance in Canada.8 9  These include increasing fines from $1 million (Cana-
dian) to $5 million (Canadian), 90 increasing prison terms from two years to one day
less than five years,9 1 increasing fines for insider trading to the greater of $5 mil-
lion (Canadian) or triple the profit made,92 strengthening the laws prohibiting mar-
ket manipulation and fraud,93 and giving the Ontario Securities Commission new
rulemaking authority. 94 This new rulemaking authority empowered the Ontario
Securities Commission to require that CEOs and CFOs certify that the financial
statements fairly present the issuer's financial condition. Further, certifications re-
garding internal controls and procedures will be required on filings made after
January 1, 2004.9'
The most recent change is the Ontario Securities Commission's release for
comment of a Proposed Policy regarding corporate governance practices. 96 The
proposals are being considered by the securities regulators of each province other
than British Columbia and Quebec. 97 The OSC requested that comments be pro-
vided by April 15, 2004.98 Among the governance proposals recommended by the
OSC are that a majority of board members should be independent and that those
directors should meet regularly The chair should be an independent director or a
88. See Karen Howlett, BCSC Head Accuses OSC Boss of Raising Fears Over Reform (Aug. 27
2003), at http://regulators.itgo.com/PI369.htm (last visited March 29, 2004). The article states that
"British Columbia Securities Commission chairman Douglas Hyndman has accused his counterpart in
Ontario of raising false alarms about his proposed securities reforms, marking the latest volley in an
escalating war of words between the two provincial watchdogs. Id. The article further notes that, due
to the "widening rift, Hyndman has stepped down from his position as head of the Canadian Secunties
Administrators, hamstringing the efforts of a group that should play a leading role in governance re-
forms in Canada. Id.






95. See OSCB, Multilateral Instrument 52-109, Certification of Disclosure in Companies Annual
and Interim Filings, at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/GCSR/inks/pdfs/OSCCertificationJunO3.pdf
96. Ontario Securities Commission, News Release, "Regulators Propose Corporate Governance
Reforms for issuers, (January 16, 2004), at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca.en/About/News/NewsRe-
leases/2004/nr_20040116_osc-corporate.htm> (last visited April, 29, 2004); and Ontario Securities
Commission, Proposed and Final Rules, "Request for Comment: Notice on Proposed Multilateral
Policy 58-201 Effective Corporate Governance, and Proposed Multilateral Instrument 58-101
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, Form 58-IOIFI and 101F2 (January 16, 2004), at
http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/Rulemaking/Policies/pol_20040116_58-201_roc.htm.
97. See http://library.lsuc.on.ca/Gl/stayinformed-corporate.htm. Both the British Columbia and
Quebec Securities Commissioners plan to publish their own corporate governance guidelines in the near
future.
98. See TSX Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance, supra note 76.
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lead director who is independent should be appointed. A written corporate gov-
ernance policy should be adoped by the board and this policy should describe the
positions of the directors and CEO. Training and director education opportunities
should be provided to the board members. A code of ethics should be adopted.
The board should create a compensation committee and also a nominating commit-
tee that will adopt policies regarding the criteria for selection of new directors.
The board will develop assessment tools to review the performance of the entire
board, as well as the performance of individual directors. Each of the proposals is
written in precatory language, giving issuers the ability to exercise a substantial
amount of discretion in deciding how best to apply the practices to its own busi-
ness.
Once adopted, the TSX's new corporate governance standards would be re-
voked to the extent they are inconsistent with, or create duplication or regulatory
overlap with, the OSC corporate governance standards. 99 These suggested changes
by the OSC would bring Canada's listed companies more in line with the govern-
ance expected of public companies in the United States. Many of the suggested
changes, such as the creation of nominating and compensation committees, are
changes that the NYSE already requires of listed companies. Similarly, the direc
tor education and assessment tools are similar to recent changes in the United
States.
GERMANY
As noted previously, boards of directors of public companies in Germany
have two levels - the Vorstand, which is a management board, and the Auf-
sichtsrat, which is a supervisory board comprised of outside directors.1°° These
are separate groups of people, such that members of the Vorstand who serve as
members of the company's executive committee are not members of the Auf-
sichtsrat. Further, the Aufstchtsrat cannot exercise managerial powers to avoid
circumvention of the required two-tier structure.
In the United States, there is a definite trend toward the appointment of a ma-
jority of outside directors; in Germany however, the two-tiered structure has for
years required independent, outside directors at the highest level. These directors
represent both capital and labor. They are appointed by the shareholders at the an-
nual meeting and also by the trade unions; employees appoint directors to the
board in furtherance of the system of labor co-determination in Germany 10'
99. See generally http://library.isuc.on.ca/GL/staymformed-corporate.htm.
100. See Thomas Marx, Doing Business in Germany (August 2001), at http://www.legamedia.net/
legapractice/marxthomas/2001/01-08/0108marx thomasbusiness-germany 01 .php (last visited
March 29 2004),
101. Section 102(l) AktG. Different compositions of the board are required under German law,
depending on the number of employees a company has. Under the German Shop Constitution Act, a
company with more than 500 but less than 2,000 employees must have one-third of the Aufsichtsrat
members represent employees. If the company has more employees, the German Co-Determination Act
requires that one-half of the Aufsichtsrat members represent employees. See Dr. Theodor Baums, Cor-
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This two-tiered structure has received criticism over the years. Some say that
the major banks in Germany exercise too much power and that just a few banks
may have seats on the boards of several major companies, leading to interlocking
directorates. °2 A conflict of interest could arise from service on the boards of
competing companies, but this is addressed through the disclosure of the board
members' other positions. Another concern is that the appointment of a labor rep-
resentative to the board could lead to a fragmented board, with labor and manage-
ment factions meeting separately with the chairman and meetings being little more
than perfunctory gatherings aimed at avoiding unpleasant discussions. The two-
tiered structure may also have an unintended effect of limiting the amount of in-
formation provided to the board. Attempts to avoid providing certain information
to the labor representative on the board may mean that the board would not receive
information that, in the United States, a board of directors would receive. One fi-
nal criticism that has been leveled against the two-tiered board structure is that the
structure breeds inefficiencies. While this may be true to some degree, in many
respects the Vorstand is essentially the same as a United States company's execu-
tive committee.
Like Canada's corporate governance code, Germany has a "comply or dis-
close" corporate governance regime. In July of 2002, Germany enacted the Trans-
parency and Publicity Act ("TransPuG"), 0 3 an act based on recommendations
made by the German Corporate Governance Commission, whose Corporate Gov-
ernance Code was first published in February of 2002.'04 TransPuG became effec
tive on January 1, 2003. The Act covers disclosure, transparency and accounting
issues. i5 Because TransPuG is so new, German courts have not yet addressed the
question of whether violation of the Corporate Governance Code creates any liabil-
ity for the company, but the courts may see compliance with the Code as creating a
safe harbor for corporations, 06
On an annual basis, the Vorstand must now file a Compliance and Disclosure
Statement with the Handelsregister or Commercial Register. 10 7 That Compliance
and Disclosure Statement is a representation both as to compliance during the year
and compliance at the time of filing with the principles in the Corporate Govern-
porate Governance Systems in Europe - Differences and Tendencies of Convergence, Crafoord Lecture,
at http://wwwjura.uos.de/institut/hwr/PDF/a0896.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
102. See Richard Deeg, German Banks and Industrial Finance in the 1990' (October 1996), at
http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/1996/i96-323.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
103. See Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, Transparency and Disclosure
Law Now in Force (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.corporate-govemance
code. de/eng/news/transparenzgesetz2002O8Oi.html (last visited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Trans-
parency and Disclosure].
104. See Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, German Corporate Govern-
ance Code, available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.delindex-e.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
105. Id
106. Hassan Sohbi, TransPuG. The Impact of Comply and Explain Regulation, Speech at 2nd An-
nual German Investor Relations Conference (Dec. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.osborneclarke.com/publications/pdf/transpug.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
107 See Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 103.
VOL. 32:2
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
ance Code. 08 If the company has failed to comply with certain provisions of the
German Corporate Governance Code, the company must specifically disclose
those provisions with which it failed to comply '09 Certain provisions of the Cor-
porate Governance Code restate mandatory provisions from German corporate law,
while other provisions are precatory and simply give guidance as to best prac
tices. O Among the precatory provisions are that no more than two members of
the Aufsichtsrat may be former Vorstand members, Aufsichtsrat members may not
serve on competitors' boards, conflicts of interest must be disclosed, committees
shall be formed to perform certain tasks, and audit committee members must be
independent."'
JAPAN
Commodore Perry's black ship has become a metaphor in Japan for that coun-
try's westernization.'2 Recent changes in the corporate governance arena in Japan
are further evidence of the country's continuing westernization.' 1 3 Despite the at-
tempts to change, Japan is still viewed as lacking in the transparency and disclo-
sure rules necessary to provide a high level of investor confidence. I4 Japan started
to transform governance practices slowly- in 2000, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
wrote to all companies listed upon it and requested that they revise their corporate
governance practices to take into account shareholder interests to a greater de-
gree." 5 The Tokyo Stock Exchange also established a permanent corporate gov-
ernance committee to advise the Exchange and listed companies.l 6 Today, how-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Government Commission, German Corporate Governance Code (May 21, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/DCG_K-E200305.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
I1. Id.
112. See Naval Historical Center, Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan: Background.
(Nov. 25 2002), available at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/ends/opening.htm [last visited
March 29, 2004].
113. The United States has been charged with exporting poor corporate governance practices. See
generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY' AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT
(Yale University Press 2001). Recent changes in governance in Japan, as discussed in this section,
make it clear that current thinking in Japan with respect to governance is tracking more closely than
ever the United States' approach to governance.
114. See Standard & Poor's, Japan Corporate Governance in Transition: Weaknesses Remain and
Challenges Continue (2002) and An Overview of Corporate Governance in Japan (2002). See also Mi-
chael Solomon Associates, Inc., Interview with Ted White, Director of Corporate Governance.
CalPERS, 4 Japan Corporate Governance Report, 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.msapr.con/pdf/JCGReport Jan03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004), in which he
states, Japan needs to strengthen the independence of their boards, improve their disclosure and
transparency, pay particular attention to the independence of company auditors, and increase their
communication with shareholders.
115. Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Interview with Takusk Shimoda, Managing Director of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 5 Japan Corporate Governance Report 2 (March/April 2003), available at
http://www.msapr.com/pdf/JCGReportApr03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
116. Id.
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ever, less than thirty percent of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
have independent directors.' 17
There may well be cultural reasons for the slow pace of change in the corpo-
rate governance area. Corporations in Japan focus on the importance of consensus
in decision making. Further, the concept of "family" is extremely important in the
Japanese capital market. Due to cross shareholdings, there are interrelationships
among many companies in Japan. These ketretsus are tied together through a
common ownership structure which may, in many instances, involve the primary
bank for one or more of the related companies. This ownership structure results in
shareholders - even large shareholders - being fairly stable and passive. Despite a
substantial shareholding, these shareholders may not exert control in the same
ways as might major shareholders in the United States. Another unusual factor in
Japan that affects the area of corporate governance has been the lack of hostile
takeovers. Unlike other markets where there may be bidding wars or hostile take-
overs, the Japanese focus on consensus will not motivate companies to "window
dress" for a potential bidding war. Finally, the Japanese government plays a strong
role in corporate governance, as the government has shown willingness to inter-
vene to assist troubled companies.
On May 22, 2002, the Diet passed revisions to Japan's Commercial Code.i"'
The revisions, effective April 1, 2003, included a number of changes affecting the
operation of boards of directors in Japan. The boards of large companies, those
most likely to be recipients of foreign investment, are now allowed to either oper-
ate using a single tier structure like boards of directors in the United States or
maintain their traditional Japanese style structure."19 Those opting for the new sys-
tem must establish three committees of the board of directors: a nomination com-
mittee, an audit committee and a compensation committee. 20 A majority of the
members of each of the three committees must be an outside director. The role of
each committee is similar to the role that committee would serve in a United States
company. Since the passage by the Diet of the laws allowing creation of Ameri-
can-style board committees, several companies in Japan have announced, or are
considering announcing, plans to reorganize their boards of directors.1
2 1
In addition to the recent revisions to the Commercial Code allowing Japanese
companies to operate using American-style boards of directors, Japan is also foi-
1 17 Id. Not only do few companies in Japan have independent directors, others simply do not see
the need for independent directors. For example, Toyota restructured its board in early 2003 to reduce
the number of directors from fifty-eight to twenty-seven. It did not before the restructuring, and still
does not, have any independent directors on the board. Id. at 4.
i 18. Ryoko Ueda, Corporate Governance and Reform of Japan Commercial Code, 2 J-IRIS Re-
search Newsletter I (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/n]02.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
119 Id. at 2.
120. Id
121. These include Sony, Onx, Hitachi, Toshiba, Minolta, Konica, and the Aeon Group, among
others. JETRO, Focus: Economic Revitalization-Corporations and Investors Position Themselves to
Compete in the New Japan, (Mar. 19, 2003), at http://www.jetro.go.jp/usa/newyork/focusnewsleter
/focus2 I.htmI (last visited March 29, 2004).
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lowing the lead of the United States in crafting reforms in the accounting and au-
diting areas. Japan's Financial Services Agency's Subcommittee on Certified Pub-
lic Accountant Regulation has recommended taking steps to enhance auditor inde
pendence, such as limiting non-audit services and rotating audit staff, as well as
working to increase the number of accountants in Japan. 12 2 Stronger government
of the accounting industry is also among the proposed reforms.1
23
MEXICO
The tenor of the corporate governance debate in Mexico. is very different than
in the United States. In the United States, the debate deals mainly with creation of
the proper balance between the shareholders and the management of companies.
In Mexico, the debate-while not overlooking the former issue - deals more with
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. 124 In both versions of
the debate on governance, the ovemding issue is one of balancing competing in-
terests.
Although there are several different forms of commercial entities in Mexico,
all companies listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores are organized as limited
liability stock corporations having the soctedad anonima designation. The general
law of corporations is the Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles,125 while the Ley
del Mercado de Valores, or Securities Act, is that country's securities law. 126 As
provided in these laws, companies are overseen by the board of directors, but in
122. Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Regulatory Watch: A Blueprint for Accounting Reform in
Japan: Blue-Ribbon Panel Releases Its Recommendations to the Financial Services Agency, 4 Japan
Corporate Governance Report 3 (January 2003), at http://www.msapr.com/pdf/JCGRe-
portJan03_English.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004). There are 14,000 CPAs in Japan currently; the
report targets having 50,000 CPAs in Japan by the year 2018. Id.
123. Id.
124. New rules to protect the interests of minonty shareholders are contained in the Securities
Act, Article 14 Bis 3, sections III and IV The new rules were enacted on June i, 2001, but became
effective the following year in conjunction with the date of the annual meeting for companies affected
by the rules. The rules provide, among other things, that:
1. Minority shareholders have the right to appoint at least one member of the board of di-
rectors for each ten percent of stock ownership;
2. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to ap-
point one comisano, or statutory auditor;
3. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to cause
a shareholders meeting to be postponed for at least three days if they have not received
sufficient information about the matters to be voted upon;
4. Minority shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the shares have the right to re-
quest that a shareholders meeting be called;
5. Minority shareholders who hold at least fifteen percent of the shares have right to file
a civil action against the board of directors; and
6. Minority shareholders who hold at least twenty percent of the shares have the right to
oppose shareholder resolutions that have been passed.
125. Carlos Creel C & Alfonso Garcia-Mingo, Corporate Governance under Mexican Law, INT'L
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addition to the board of directors, the company must have a comisarto, or statutory
auditor who has an obligation to oversee operations of the company and deliver an
annual report. 127 Generally, these individuals are the partners of the company's
outside auditing firm.
On June 9 1999, a new Codigo de Mejores Pacticas Corporativas, or Best
Practices for Corporate Governance for Mexico, was introduced. 128 The Code had
been drafted through the cooperation of the Mexican Bankers' Association, the
Mexican Institute of Finance Executives, the Mexican Institute of Public Account-
ants, and the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Mexico's stock exchange. 29 The Code
addresses governance issues relating to the structure and function of boards of di-
rectors, 30 auditing of the company and oversight of internal controls,' 3 ' and fi-
nance, planning, transparency and disclosure in the provision of relevant informa-
tion to shareholders.132  Compliance with the Code is voluntary- Mexico has
followed a prnciples-based rather than rules-based approach to governance. 
133
Companies must file a report annually with the Bolsa identifying any areas of the
Code with which they are non-compliant and explaining the reasons for the non-
compliance. 
34
Like the United States, Mexico has a single government agency responsible
for the oversight of the country's capital markets. The Comision Nactonal Ban-
caria y de Valores, or National Banking and Securities Commission, oversees the
127 Antonio Franck C, Rafael Robles Miaja, & Manuel Galicia R, Amendments to the Mexican
Securities Law, INT'L FIN. L. REV., in THE IFLR GUIDE TO MEXICO 83, 90 (Ben Maiden ed., 2001).
128. Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Corporate Governance Code for Mexico 1, at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country_documents/mexico/mexico.code_en.pdf (Sep. 26, 2002) (last vis-
ited March 29, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico Code].
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2. Section I of the Code explains that day-to-day operations are the responsibility of
management, while the board of directors is to provide strategic oversight. Id. Section 1.2 deals with
the number of directors, discourages the use of alternate directors, requires that the board include out-
side directors, and suggests the information to be provided to shareholders to enable them to vote on the
slate of proposed directors. Id. Section 1.3 deals with the structure of the board and recommends the
use of audit, compensation and finance and planning committees. Id.
131. See Section 3.2 of the Corporate Governance Code for Mexico in Mexico Code, supra note
128, at 2.
132. See Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Corporate Governance Code for Mexico, in Mexico Code,
supra note 128, at 2. Until recently, it was not the common practice in Mexico for companies to send
lengthy proxy statements containing information about the director nominees and other issues; rather,
the primary communication tool with shareholders was the company's annual report, which is required
by Article 14 of the Ley Del Mercado de Valores (the Securities Act of Mexico). There is still great
reluctance, due to security concerns, for companies in Mexico to provide the type of disclosure regard-
ing executive compensation that shareholders in the United States are accustomed to receiving. Rather,
if companies do make executive compensation disclosures, they do so by aggregating the compensation
information rather than by providing detailed information about specific executives. They may also
discuss the general compensation philosophy of the company in the disclosure materials.
133. Bryan W Husted & Carlos Serrano, Corporate Governance in Mexico 15-16, at
http://egade.sistema.itesm.mx/investigacion/documentos/documentos/9egade-husted.pdf (May 2001)
(last visited March 29, 2004).
134. Id at 15.
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registration of securities and regulates issuers.135  The Securities Act sets forth
general communications requirements, such as the requirement that a company
provide an annual report to shareholders. 36 The company's audit committee must,
at the annual shareholders meeting, give a report to shareholders. 37 The Act also
defines independent directors and requires that the chair and a majority of the
members of the audit committee be independent. 38  Most Mexican companies
have only recently begun to establish audit committees and draft charters for those
committees; in many instances, they follow the charters used by United States
companies as models.
UNITED KINGDOM
It is the United Kingdom which produced the Cadbury Report, one of the first
extensive reviews of governance practices.139 Over the years, a number of other
reports issued in the UK have provided further thought on governance practices.
These include the Greenbury Report, 40 which focused on disclosure of director
pay- the Hampel Report 14 issued in June of 1998, which became the Combined
Code and is discussed below; the Turnbull Report, 142 issued in September of 1999
which reviewed companies' approach to internal controls; and most recently the
135. Id.
136. Creel C & Garcia-Mingo, supra note 125, at 44.
137 Id. at 46. Securities Act, Section 14 Bis 3, subsections IV and V as amended.
138. Franck C, supra note 127, at 86.
Securities Act, Article 14, states that the following will not be deemed independent directors:
I. Employees or managers of the company, or persons employed by the company during
the prior year;
2. Significant shareholders who, although they are not employed by the company. wield
management power;
3. Affiliates of groups providing consulting services to the issuer if the transaction with
the issuer represents ten percent or more of that firm's revenues;
4. Customers, suppliers, debtors, creditors, partners, directors or employees of other enti-
ties having an important relationship with the issuer;
5. Employees of charitable institutions that receive significant contributions from the is-
suer, defined as more than fifteen percent of the grants received by the institution;
6. Senior executives of other companies, where senior executive of the issuer serves on
the other company's board; and
7. Spouses and other close relatives of those listed above.
139. The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance & Gee and Co. Ltd, Re-
port of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992), at
http://www.eegi.org/codes/countrydocuments/uk/cadbury.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
140. See Greenbury Recommendations, at http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/llA/uploads/2c9l03-
ea9f7e9fbe-7e22/Greenburyreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
141. See G. P Stapledon, The Hampel Report on Corporate Governance, 16 COMPANY AND
SECURITIES L. J. 408, 408-413 (1998), available at http://www.corpgov.com/publications
/fulltext/hampelreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
142. See THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND & WALES, INTERNAL
CONTROL. GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE (Accountancy Books
1999), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/countrydocuments/uk/tumbul.pdf (last visited March
29, 2004).
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Higgs Report, 143 issued in January of 2003.
The issuance of the Higgs Report, commissioned by the Department of Trade
and Industry, builds upon the corporate governance foundation laid in the Cadbury
report. Some criticized the report, however, as an attempt to go too far in regulat-
ing corporations. 144 The concern appears to be that the UK, if not cautious in
adopting governance reforms, will be carried along with the reforms in the United
States and other countries in adopting a rules-based approach rather than the prin-
ciples-based approach, which has been the hallmark of governance in the UK.
Primary laws governing UK corporations are the Companies Act of 1985,145
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,I6 the rules applicable to mergers
adopted by the Takeover Panel, 14 7 and the Financial Services Authority's Code of
Market Conduct. 148 In addition, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, as
supplemented by the Turnbull Report, applies to all listed companies in the UK,
including those listed on the London Stock Exchange. 14 9 As in Mexico, compli-
ance with the Code is voluntary '5o If companies choose not to comply with the
Code, they must disclose the non-compliance in their annual report and state the
reasons for the non-compliance. 151
The Combined Code requires that non-executive directors comprise at least
one half of the directors. 152 A majority of these non-executive directors should
also be free from any relationship with the company or management that would
143. DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
(Jan. 2003), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/nonexecreview/pdfs/higgsreport.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2004).
144. See Alexandra Johnson, Kelley Rejects Higgs Criticism as 'Disturbing Complacency
ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, (March 12, 2003), at http://www.accountancyage.com/News/i 132858 (last
visited March 29, 2004). The article refers to a speech given by Ruth Kelly, financial secretary to
Treasury, in which she defends the Higgs Report. The Higgs Report had been criticized in the UK as
rule-book and a step too far toward the US-style rules-based approach to corporate governance. Id See
also David Rae, Former Dixons Chairman Slams Higgs, ACCOUNTANCYAGE.COM, (March 5, 2003), at
http://www.accountancyage.com/News/ 132772 (last visited March 29,2004).
145. HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 88, (Andrew Davies, Gilian Bailey, &
Eric Roydhouse, eds., Butterworths (1999)).
146. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which was last revised and reissued in July 2000,
is similar to the Williams Act of 1968, which amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The
City Code provides for equal treatment of shareholders, disclosure to shareholders, and good faith con-
sideration by the board of offers and prevents market manipulation.
147 CHARLES M. NATHAN & MICHAEL R. FISCHER, AN OVERVIEW OF TAKEOVER REGIMES IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND GERMANY, (Latham & Watkins, 2003), at
http://www.lw.com/resource/publications/-pdf/pub485.pdf (last visited March 29, 2004).
148. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE CODE OF MARKET CONDUCT (FSA Handbook, Re-
lease 026 2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbooklBL2MARpp/Mar/Chapter I.pdf (last
visited March 29, 2004).
149. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2003), at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pdf/combinedcodefinal.pdf [hereinafler COMBINED CODE]
(last visited March 29, 2004).
150. Id at I.
151. Id.
152. Id at 7
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interfere with the exercise of their independent professional judgment.i53
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) recently acted to require that stock-
based compensation plans be approved by the shareholders. Although a version of
this rule existed previously, the new rule is more restrictive. Like this provision of
the NYSE's listing standards, the Combined Code requires shareholder approval of
any new long-term incentive plans. 154 Further, beginning this year, shareholders
are required to approve the compensation report to shareholders.
155
Institutional investors have great influence in the UK, just as they do in the
United States. Pension funds, in particular, may hold a large percentage of the
stock of a company Many institutional investors in the UK have issued their own
corporate governance guidelines, and will vote the stock they hold in accordance
with the governance principles set forth in those guidelines. The role of institu-
tional investors in the UK will evolve in coming years from simply voting the
shares they hold to engaging management in dialogue regarding significant gov-
ernance issues.
Although many countries are following the lead of the United States with re-
spect to governance practices, the United States has begun to follow the lead of the
United Kingdom in at least one respect. 156 In the United Kingdom, the roles of the
chairman and the chief executive officer have been separate for many years.
57
Only recently has this become more commonplace in the United States.
Further governance reforms appear to be needed in the UK. The Institute of
Internal Auditors for the UK and Ireland is firmly of the opinion that additional
work is needed in the governance area to reach the point at which investors can
have a higher level of confidence in the governance practices of UK companies. 158
Specifically that organization has concluded that the UK should migrate from the
comply and explain approach to more of a rules-based approach that enforces
compliance with governance principles.
5 9
153. Id.
154. COMBINED CODE, supra note 149, at 14.
155. Disapproval would have no legal effect, but would be an indicator to the full board of the
shareholders' dissatisfaction with its actions in the area of compensation.
156. US Heading for UK-style Governance, CORP SECRETARY 7 (Feb./March 2003).
157. AccountancyAge.com, FTSE-lO0 Fails to Deliver on Higgs, (Feb. 7, 2003), at
http://www.accoutancyage.com/News/l 132457 (last visited March 29, 2004). Despite the separation of
roles which has been the clear best practice for many years in the UK, five percent of companies there
still combine the roles. There are no legal prohibitions against combining these roles. Id.
159. INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS - UK AND IRELAND, A NEW AGE FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM 3 (2002), at http://www.blindtiger.co.uklIlA/uploads/-38c9a362-ed7 Ice5fa5--
72ff/CorporateGovemanceReformiJuly2002.pdf (last visited March 29,2004).
160. Id. at 6. Among other changes recommended by the Institute are that public companies
should be required to assess the effectiveness of their internal controls and make disclosures with re-
spect to the effectiveness. This is similar to the requirement set forth in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.
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CONCLUSION
Over the next few years, whether current efforts to reform corporate govern-
ance practices around the world are successful will be seen through the eyes of in-
vestors. If the world's capital markets perform well, this will be an indication that
the degradation of investor confidence in recent years has been arrested and, per-
haps, reversed. International organizations will continue to play a key role in for-
mulating governance principles that have international currency Regulators must
continue to work together very closely to assure that laws and regulations passed
by various countries allow for the free flow of capital into and out of the global
capital markets. Finally we are likely to see a continued migration away from
principles-based governance to the rules-based governance of the United States.
